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1.	INTRODUCTION
The risk and incidence of sexual abuse of children in an institutional context has been brought to increasingly greater public attention since the 1990’s, both in Australia and around the world.​[1]​  In Australia, several state inquiries since the mid-1990’s addressed sexual abuse of children in state care and religious institutions in Australia,​[2]​ and there have been numerous other state and federal inquiries in that time which have considered in some way the issue of child sexual abuse in the context of a broader or different remit.​[3]​  However, on 11 January 2013 a national Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (“the Royal Commission”) was established to focus specifically on how to better prevent, report and respond to child sexual abuse in an institutional context.  It is expected to deliver its final report by the end of 2017.  
The Royal Commission’s work is revealing the nature and extent of child abuse in a wide range of different institutional contexts in Australia.​[4]​ As at 10 September 2015, the Royal Commission had received allegations relating to 3,566 different institutions.​[5]​  In its Consultation Paper on Redress and Civil Litigation (“Consultation Paper”), ​[6]​ the Royal Commission analysed the data obtained from private sessions held between 7 May 2013 and 31 August 2014 in relation to reported incidents of child sexual abuse and categorised it by institution type, or activity. The incidence per category was as follows: 34.6% in out-of-home residential care; 28.1% in educational day and boarding schools; 16.6% in religious activities; 7.6% in out-of-home foster or kinship care; 4.2% in recreational, sporting and hobby groups or institutions; 2.1% in health and allied fields or by medical practitioners; 1.1% in juvenile justice; 0.9% in childcare centres, and smaller representation of incidents in other institutional categories.​[7]​   A significant proportion of this reported abuse related to faith-based institutions. For example, of reported incidents of sexual abuse in out-of-home residential care, 64% was in faith-based residential homes.​[8]​  Of reported incidents of sexual abuse in a school setting, 77.1% of incidents was in a faith-based day or boarding school.​[9]​ It has been estimated that there may be at least 60,000 survivors of institutional child abuse who may be eligible for compensation if a national redress scheme were established.​[10]​
As noted by the Royal Commission, ‘when a child is sexually abused while in the care of an institution, the impact can be devastating and last for a lifetime.’​[11]​  The harm can be physical as well as psychological and emotional, and the trauma associated with it can impact significantly on the survivor’s future capacity for work, the ability to maintain personal relationships and a survivor’s psychological wellbeing.  
Many survivors of institutional child sexual abuse have experienced considerable difficulty in seeking financial compensation for such harm.​[12]​  There have been several state government ex gratia payment schemes​[13]​ to date, however they have been limited in scope to abuse in government care in institutions of those states.​[14]​  Some survivors have obtained payments through private schemes such as Towards Healing and the Melbourne Response run by the Catholic Church​[15]​  and other private settlements such as the Procedures for Complaints of Sexual and Other Abuse against Salvationists and Workers 1996 by the Salvation Army.​[16]​  There is no comprehensive national redress scheme currently in place, although this has been recommended by the Royal Commission.​[17]​ 
Another option is for survivors to bring proceedings in tort seeking an order from the court for damages by way of financial compensation for harm from either the perpetrator of the abuse or from the institution in which the abuse occurred.​[18]​  The focus of this chapter is on the ways in which survivors can bring claims in tort and the obstacles to such claims under the current state of the law in Australia. 
Tort law is the law dealing with civil wrongs at common law.​[19]​  Sexual abuse of a child is of course a criminal offence, but it is also capable of giving rise to an action in tort against the perpetrator of the abuse and in some cases against the institution in which the abuse occurred.  If successful, proceedings in tort can lead to remedies in damages.  Damages are an award of money ordered by the court to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff.  Damages are ‘real’ in the sense of being awarded as real compensation for harm suffered, and can be potentially substantial in amount.  The amount of damages can be significantly higher than amounts typically paid under ex gratia payment schemes.​[20]​  Successful proceedings can also have a very significant vindicating effect for a plaintiff,​[21]​ affirming their story on public record in a judgment of the court.  An award of damages also has the effect of punishing perpetrators or responsible institutions. There are of course well known difficulties for plaintiffs in court proceedings that can be particularly difficult for survivors of institutional child sexual abuse: court proceedings can be expensive, uncertain, drawn-out and lengthy, as well as being emotionally and psychologically traumatic through revisiting the abuse in evidence and cross-examination.  However, for some survivors, the opportunity to seek formal recognition of the wrongdoing and potentially substantial financial compensation will warrant commencing proceedings.  
This chapter highlights some of the procedural and doctrinal obstacles and uncertainties in the common law which currently prevent many survivors having a clearly available action in tort under Australian law.  The possibility of Australian law reform to address some of the difficulties is also examined briefly in light of the recommendations of the Royal Commission for civil litigation reform.​[22]​ The recommendations made by the Family and Community Development Committee of the Victorian Parliament Inquiry into the Handling of Child Abuse by Religious and Other Non-Government Organisations in its Betrayal of Trust Report in 2013 are also considered. ​[23]​  

2.	 STATUTORY LIMITATION PERIODS AND HISTORICAL CHILD ABUSE 
A fundamental difficulty encountered by many survivors of historical childhood abuse wishing to pursue a claim in tort is the expiration of a statutory limitation period which prescribes the time frame in which a claim must be brought.   It is widely acknowledged that very many survivors of childhood sexual abuse take years to reveal their abuse for a broad spectrum of reasons, including: incapacitating psychological damage as a result of the abuse; no access to legal advice; lack of awareness of the connection between the abuse and psychiatric illness; fear of reprisal; public humiliation; self-blame; fear of being disbelieved; and the possibility of re-traumatisation.​[24]​ The Commission found that the average time taken by those who attended its private sessions to disclose their sexual abuse was 22 years from the date of the abuse.​[25]​ For many survivors, the statutory limitation periods discussed below will have expired before they are ready or able to commence proceedings.
Limitation periods for personal injury in Australia
	All Australian States and Territories impose limitation periods for claims for personal injury, though they are not uniform.​[26]​ Since 2002, some Australian jurisdictions​[27]​ have enacted limitation provisions that generally follow the recommendations of the Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence​[28]​  though they differ in important respects.​[29]​ Generally, these provide for a limitation period of 3 years commencing upon the date of ‘discoverability’ of the cause of action with a ‘longstop’ period (12 years) running from the date of event giving rise to the claim. In some jurisdictions the courts have discretion to extend the long-stop period to the expiry of a period of 3 years from the date of discoverability. There are provisions for the suspension of limitation periods during incapacity of the plaintiff, including minority​[30]​ or disability. In NSW and Victoria particularly harsh provisions apply to minors following amendment to limitation statutes in 2002. In those states the limitation period continues to run during minority in most cases where a child has a parent or guardian, except where minors were injured by the parent, guardian or close associate of the parent or guardian.​[31]​ 
Limitation periods aim to preserve fairness between parties. Delays in commencing proceedings may lead to loss of evidence or it may be oppressive to defendants to allow historical claims to be maintained. Defendants need to be able to arrange their affairs without continuing doubt concerning future liability. The public interest requires that legal disputes should be settled expeditiously.​[32]​ Yet the law must balance fairness to defendants against access to justice for plaintiffs​[33]​ so that a limitation period does not operate to bar claims unfairly.
	Limitation legislation requires many plaintiffs whose claims are statute barred to respond to defendants’ early applications to the courts to strike out the claims. The plaintiff then has to establish that it is just and reasonable for a Court to grant an extension of time to commence proceedings. Factors which courts are required to consider include: the length of the delay and the reasons for it; any prejudice to the defendant owing to lost evidence; the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any conduct by the defendant that induced the delay by the plaintiff; the plaintiff’s efforts to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of advice received; and the time when the cause of action was discoverable.​[34]​ Proceedings regarding the extension of the limitation period occur well before the Plaintiff’s substantive claim can be tried.​[35]​ The litigation is expensive, uncertain as to outcome, involves the risk of an adverse costs order and imposes a further emotional and psychological weight upon a vulnerable plaintiff survivor.
Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Cases and the ‘Limitation Defence’
	Ellis v Pell and the Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney and Duggan​[36]​ illustrates the influence of the limitation defence in historical child sexual abuse cases.​[37]​ There the plaintiff was successful in obtaining an extension of time in which to sue the second defendant (the Church trustees). The court held that he had not become aware of the nature and seriousness of his injury until September 2001, though the childhood sexual abuse he experienced had stopped in 1979. The court exercised its discretion to grant an extension of time having decided that it would be just and reasonable to do so because the evidence established that there could be ‘a fair trial of the Plaintiff’s action albeit not a perfect one’.​[38]​ The plaintiff had to adduce much detailed evidence of his psychiatric injury and he was cross-examined for more than 3 days during the hearing of the Limitation issue.​[39]​ Ultimately in the NSW Court of Appeal, the plaintiff’s substantive claim was dismissed, with the Court deciding that there was no viable cause of action against the archbishop or the trustees neither of whom was an appropriate defendant.​[40]​  
	Statutory limitation periods are especially harsh in cases of historical child sexual abuse because in many cases, the main cause of delay in bringing proceedings is the very psychological injury that the abuse has caused. There is no limitation period applying to criminal prosecution for the sexual abuse in respect of which adult survivors seek compensation. It has been argued that this anomaly should be a persuasive factor enabling survivors to bring civil claims out of time.​[41]​ 
Legislative reforms to date
In some Australian parliaments there is now recognition that justice for survivors of child sexual abuse requires alteration or removal of statutory limitation periods. In NSW the Limitation Amendment (Child Abuse) Act 2016 (NSW) has been enacted. It removes altogether the limitation period in respect of damages claims for death or personal injury arising from child abuse.  ‘Child abuse’ is defined as abuse committed against a person when the person is under 18 years of age, that is sexual abuse, serious physical abuse, and/or other abuse perpetrated in connection with sexual or serious physical abuse.​[42]​  In Victoria, limitation periods have been removed completely in cases of child sexual abuse. ​[43]​ The Limitation of Actions Amendment (Child Abuse) Act 2015 retrospectively removes limitation periods for causes of action for damage resulting from physical or sexual abuse (and consequent psychological damage) when the plaintiff was a minor. ​[44]​
	 It is noteworthy that the courts have statutory power to stay any kind of proceedings, either permanently or for a fixed time​[45]​ and that power is not diminished by such reforms to remove limitation periods that have or may be enacted.  Further, Supreme Courts have inherent power to permanently stay proceedings that are an abuse of process​[46]​ where there cannot be a fair trial due to delay.​[47]​ 

3.	IS THERE A ‘LEGAL PERSON’ DEFENDANT WITH ASSETS TO MEET A CLAIM?
For a survivor to bring a claim in tort against an institution, there must be a ‘legal person’, that is a corporate entity or an identifiable individual or group of individuals, that can be sued. It is not possible to bring legal proceedings against associations or clubs or churches unless they are incorporated.​[48]​ Further, the legal entity that is sued must be the same legal entity that was in existence and was responsible for the plaintiff’s welfare at the time of the childhood abuse, rather than a new entity that has replaced it, unless somehow the plaintiff can establish that the new entity is the successor, in a legal sense, to the liabilities of the earlier body. These issues present very real obstacles to claims in tort by many survivors of institutional childhood abuse where the abuse took place in religious institutions. Identifying a corporate entity that was in existence at the time the abuse occurred, and that still exists and has assets that would be available to meet a judgment, can be problematic. 
Identification of proper defendants and capacity of faith based institutions to meet claims 
Many religious institutions are unincorporated associations linked to established churches and led by clergy or other religious or lay members of a church. A hierarchical religious organisation usually exists and the institutions are usually located on church property. But there is no corporate structure and no legal relationship between church corporations or trusts and the institutions or the perpetrators of abuse.​[49]​  This is particularly relevant in relation to the Catholic Church where for historical reasons dioceses are unincorporated associations,​[50]​ as are religious orders of priests, brothers and nuns.  Notwithstanding the fact that these churches and religious groups have the benefit of perpetual succession​[51]​ in relation to property ownership under state and territory legislation,​[52]​  they cannot be joined to proceedings.
The NSW Court of Appeal decision in Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church v Ellis & Anor​[53]​ provides an illustration of the difficulties faced by plaintiffs seeking remedies against church organisations. There the plaintiff joined as defendants the Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney, a statutory body corporate established under the Roman Catholic Church Trust Property Act 1936 (​http:​/​​/​www.austlii.edu.au​/​au​/​legis​/​nsw​/​consol_act​/​rcctpa1936413​/​​) (NSW). The plaintiff’s case was that the Trustees were trustees of church property for the Archdiocese of Sydney including the church at Bass Hill where the plaintiff was sexually abused by the parish priest. The plaintiff argued that ‘as the permanent corporate entity or interface between the spiritual and temporal sides of the Church the Trustees were legally responsible for the acts and omissions of the Archbishop and his subordinates,’​[54]​ including the abusive parish priest. The evidence was that the Trustees had no role in the appointment or oversight of priests.​[55]​ The plaintiff’s claim against the trustees failed​[56]​  in the Court of Appeal where it was held that: 
 (N)othing in the Act makes them the universal embodiment of the Church within the Archdiocese. The commonplace stipulation that the body corporate is capable of being sued in its corporate (name) is not a provision that renders the Trustee some universal nominal defendant responsive in law to any and every claim for legal redress that a person might wish to bring against a Catholic in the Archdiocese. At [118] per Mason JA, Ipp & McColl JJA agreeing.​[57]​
Survivors simply have no claim in tort against institutions if there is no identifiable corporate entity with the financial capacity to meet damages claims. 
4.  AVAILABLE CAUSES OF ACTION IN TORT
A.    Advantages and Challenges of Claims in Tort
Where survivors are able to identify a suitable defendant, and assuming they can overcome a statutory limitation period, there are several common law tortious causes of action which may be available. Tortious damages have the potential to be considerably greater than the maximum sums available pursuant to existing statutory criminal injuries compensation schemes.​[58]​ The possibility of awards of aggravated​[59]​ or exemplary damages​[60]​ provides not only vindication for the victim​[61]​ but a punishment for the abuser or the institution and must have a significant deterrent effect in respect of future abuse.​[62]​  
But inevitably there are difficulties in historical cases of childhood abuse. Fundamental elements of the claims will be difficult to prove, even on the civil standard of proof, where there is often no direct evidence of the abuse other than the testimony of the plaintiff who would have been a child at the time. Many years may have passed since the abuse. There will likely not be any corroborative witnesses. Any relevant institutional records may no longer exist. The personal difficulties confronted by survivors cannot be underestimated: a plaintiff will need to be steeled to see the often protracted civil litigation process through to a conclusion. In most cases, plaintiffs will be unable to obtain legal aid to cover their legal costs and if unsuccessful, they face the prospect of a costs order. 
B:	Proceedings in Tort against a Perpetrator
If a survivor wishes to commence proceedings against a perpetrator of abuse, and can overcome the relevant limitation period, the causes of action which are most likely to be relevant to consider are as follows:
	Battery:   to succeed in an action for battery a plaintiff will have to prove on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant intentionally​[63]​ committed a positive​[64]​ and voluntary act​[65]​ that directly caused contact with the plaintiff’s body.​[66]​ The defendant need not intend to cause any harm or injury to the plaintiff​[67]​ because the trespass to person torts are actionable ‘per se’: that is without proof of any actual damage. The trespass to person torts are very old common law causes of action and exist to protect the bodily integrity of the individual​[68]​ so that it is the trespassory act itself that gives rise to the cause of action rather than any harm caused:
The fundamental principle, plain and incontestable, is that every person's body is inviolate, it has long been established that any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to a battery. ... The breadth of the principle reflects the fundamental nature of the interest
so protected.​[69]​
In the case of a sexual battery of a child victim by an adult, none of the possible defences would be available (contact that is an inevitable or permissible part of the ordinary contact of daily life,​[70]​ consent,​[71]​ self-defence,​[72]​ necessity​[73]​ or lawful justification.​[74]​) 
Where a plaintiff suffers actual physical and or psychological damage as a result of the trespassory act, then appropriate compensatory damages will be awarded; aggravated and exemplary damages may also be awarded in appropriate cases.​[75]​ Damages available in cases of institutional child abuse are discussed in more detail below.
	Assault:  survivors may also have been subjected to physical threats which would give rise to claims in tort for assault;
	False Imprisonment: a survivor might have been held against his or her will by a perpetrator;
	Wilkinson v Downton​[76]​:  there may also be a claim available pursuant to the cause of action on the case first identified in that case, in circumstances where a defendant has used deliberately threatening and intimidating behaviour and words which cause the victim psychiatric injury, often in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder.​[77]​  
Commencing proceedings against the perpetrator may be impossible or impractical. The perpetrator may be dead, or may be in prison, untraceable, bankrupt or have no significant assets.  
C: 	Proceedings against the Institution
An alternative approach is to seek to sheet home responsibility to the institution in which the abuse took place by means of one of the following:
	Vicarious Liability for one of the above Intentional Torts: a survivor might seek to establish that the institution in which the abuse took place is vicariously liable for the tort committed by the perpetrator;​[78]​  
	Liability in Negligence based on the Non-Delegable Duty of Care: a survivor might seek to establish that the deliberate acts of a perpetrator constituted a breach of the institution’s non-delegable duty of care causing damage to the victim;​[79]​ or
	Liability in the Tort of Negligence: where an institution failed to take reasonable precautions to avoid abuse of children to whom it owed a duty of care thereby causing damage to the chid.​[80]​ 

The first two of these causes of action were relied upon unsuccessfully by the plaintiff in New South Wales v Lepore,​[81]​ discussed below.  This decision highlights the difficulties confronting survivors of child sexual abuse pursuing tortious actions against institutions under Australian common law. 
(1)	Vicarious Liability of Institutions 
Vicarious liability in the law of tort is the liability of a defendant to compensate a plaintiff for the tortious act or omission of another, whether negligent or intentional, in the absence of fault by the defendant.  Vicarious liability has been recognised as having its basis in a combination of policy considerations. Professor Fleming once observed that a range of different policy considerations underpin the modern doctrine. ​[82]​  One is what has become known as the ‘enterprise risk’ consideration, that it is fair and just that an enterprise which employs others to pursue an endeavour for economic gain, and which creates a risk of harm in the process, should be responsible for risks that materialise in the pursuit of that aim. Secondly, there is the ‘deep pocket’ principle,​[83]​ referring to the fact that an employer is usually more likely to be financially capable of paying compensation than an employee who may be a ‘man of straw.’  Another is that it is an efficient mode of loss distribution because employers are usually in a position to absorb the cost more easily than an individual. Fourthly, there is the potential for deterrence as the risk of liability creates an incentive for the employer to select employees carefully and put in place any measures possible to avoid the risk of liability. 
	Its principal application has been in relation to the liability of employers for wrongdoing by employees, and the liability of principals for wrongdoing by agents.  For the purposes of this chapter, the focus will be on the liability of institutions as employers of employees who are found to have sexually abused a child in the care or supervision of the institution.  In this context, the law on vicarious liability requires a relationship of employment between the wrongdoer and the employer. The act complained of must also have been done ‘in the course of employment’, so as to establish a sufficient degree of connection between the wrongful conduct and the employer to warrant making the employer being held vicariously liable for the act of their employee.  
(a)	Employment Relationship
Under Australian law, the requirement for a relationship of employment is a deeply entrenched limit upon the scope of vicarious liability. There is no single test by which an employment relationship is established. Rather, there are a number of different factors which the courts consider to determine whether a wrongdoer is an ‘employee.’  These include examining how, where and by whom the work is done, the employer’s right to suspend or dismiss the person, how the person is paid (ie by regular wage or by invoice), what forms of tax are paid, who supplies any tools or equipment, and whether work can be subcontracted.​[84]​  The degree of control exerted by an employer over an employee is no longer determinative, but it is a relevant factor in determining the existence of an employment contract and it is necessary to consider the totality of the relationship between the parties.​[85]​  However, each case will turn on its own facts.​[86]​
	Religious institutions
One potential difficulty for survivors of child sexual abuse in seeking to make a religious institution vicariously liable is that the relationship between priests or other religious officeholders and the relevant church or religious body may not meet the tests for a relationship of employment. In Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church v Ellis​[87]​ Mason P indicated that it would be ‘wrong to see holding an ecclesiastical office as necessarily incompatible with a legal relationship capable of giving rise to some incidents of an employment relationship.’​[88]​ However, there may be no contract of employment, or remuneration, or other classical indicia of employment. However, in both Canada and England vicarious liability has been imposed in a religious context despite these issues, on the basis that the relationship between the institution and the priest was ‘akin to an employment relationship’.​[89]​ 
(b)	The ‘course of employment’ test and intentional wrongdoing under Australian law
It is also necessary to demonstrate that the wrongful act occurred in the ‘course of employment’.  This requires that the wrongful act was either an authorised act, or if unauthorised, that it was so connected with authorised acts that it may be regarded as a mode — albeit an improper mode — of doing them.  According to this test, the employer is not responsible if the unauthorised act is an independent act of the employee.​[90]​  The ‘course of employment’ test is a threshold test, a ‘necessary element’​[91]​ of a finding of vicarious liability. However, determining when intentional wrongdoing, such as theft,​[92]​ fraud,​[93]​ and physical assault, including sexual assault, can be regarded as an improper mode of doing an authorised act is notoriously difficult.  The test has been interpreted by the High Court to require that the impugned act was done in intended pursuit of the employer’s interests or in intended performance of the contract of employment, or in ostensible pursuit of the employer’s business or in apparent execution of authority which the employer holds the employee out as having.​[94]​ Otherwise, deliberate wrongdoing motivated by other factors such as ‘passion and resentment’, or otherwise ‘done neither in furtherance of the master’s interests nor under his express or implied authority, nor as an incident to, or in consequence of, anything [the employee] was employed to do’​[95]​ will not give rise to vicarious liability.  
The specific question whether an institution could be vicariously liable for child sexual abuse was considered by the High Court in New South Wales v Lepore.​[96]​ These proceedings arose from three appeals heard concurrently, each relating to sexual abuse by a teacher of a child at school. Three judges (Gummow and Hayne JJ in a joint judgment, and Callinan J) held that sexual abuse could not be regarded as falling within the course of employment.​[97]​ Gleeson CJ, Gaudron J and Kirby J all accepted that in certain circumstances an employer could be liable for sexual abuse by an employee. The lack of a clear ratio has left the law in an uncertain state.  Furthermore, the reasons of those judges in favour of vicarious liability extending to institutional child sexual abuse differed significantly. 
Gleeson CJ did not depart from the traditional course of employment test, however his Honour observed that an examination of the precise role of the teacher could demonstrate that ‘where the teacher-student relationship is invested with a high degree of power and intimacy, the use of that power and intimacy to commit sexual abuse may provide a sufficient connection between the sexual assault and the employment to make it just to treat such contact as occurring in the course of employment.’​[98]​ This would seem to arise most clearly in the context of residential care. 
Gaudron J noted that vicarious liability will generally be justified on the basis of ostensible authority (a species of estoppel).​[99]​  However she also found that a party will normally not be so estopped unless there is a ‘close connection between what was done and what that person was engaged to do.’​[100]​  
Kirby J​[101]​ proposed that the law of vicarious liability should be developed to address such claims, approving the developments in the law that had at that time already been made in England and Canada.  
McHugh J did not need to decide the issue, finding liability could be made out on the grounds of a non-delegable duty (discussed below).  
Subsequent Australian consideration of the different reasons for judgment given in New South Wales v Lepore has given rise to mixed results in the context of institutional liability for child sexual abuse. 
Withyman v State of New South Wales​[102]​ concerned a sexual relationship between a female teacher and an intellectually handicapped male student in a special school (although not a minor).  The New South Wales Court of Appeal held that vicarious liability did not arise.  Allsop P (with whom Meagher and Ward JJA agreed) found that:
…  Sexual activity is as divorced and far from the gentle caring teacher’s role as it is from the stern, detached disciplinarian’s.  The connection and nexus was not such as to justify imposition on the State for Ms Blackburn’s apparently, out of character, sexual misconduct.  The school did not create or enhance the risk of such by her duties.​[103]​   
Erlich v Leifer,​[104]​ concerned sexual abuse by a headmistress of an ultra-orthodox Jewish school of a female student at the school.  Rush J focussed upon the misuse of the high degree of ‘power and intimacy’ held by the headmistress over the students at the school.​[105]​ His Honour distinguished Withyman on the basis of the ‘unrestrained power’ occupied by the headmistress in the school in the present case and the vulnerability of the students to abuse of that power.​[106]​  This was found to give rise to the relevant connection between her acts and the school so as to establish vicarious liability.​[107]​ 
A, DC v Prince Alfred College Incorporated​[108]​ concerned claims of sexual abuse of a student by a teacher in a school boarding house.  At trial, Vanstone J dismissed the claim, applying Withyman. Her Honour found that, ‘although it may be accepted that when rostered on duty overnight [the boarding master] had a role which involved responsibility for an overall supervision of the boarding house, that is very far from amounting to a duty to engage in intimate physical behaviour with a student.’​[109]​  The Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court (Kourakis CJ, Gray and Peek JJ) unanimously allowed the appeal but each for slightly different reasons.​[110]​  Kourakis CJ found the sexual touching of the plaintiff by the boarding master took place in the ostensible discharge of his responsibility for the care of the boarders at night, and there was therefore a close connection between the duties and the offence.​[111]​  Gray J found that, ‘The school put [the boarding master] in a position of authority, trust and intimacy in relation to young, vulnerable boys who were living away from home for the first time’ and held that ‘the school created and enhanced the risk that [the boarding master] could abuse students.​[112]​  Peek J focused upon the ‘combination of intimacy, power and subservience’ which rendered the appellant particularly vulnerable to abuse, and also upon fact that the abuse was conducted ‘under the cover’ of authority with respect to bed-time supervision.’​[113]​  .
These cases demonstrate that the state of the law in Australia is presently uncertain as intermediate courts of appeal grapple with the proper test to apply in light of the range of different tests that are evident in Lepore.    
 (c)	Comparison with development of the law in England and Canada
Before New South Wales v Lepore, other common law jurisdictions had already expanded the law of vicarious liability beyond the strict limitations of the ‘course of employment’ test in the context of child sexual abuse in an institutional context.  These developments were considered in Lepore, but only Kirby J supported a similar development in the Australian law.  
The move to a broader test commenced with the decision of Bazley v Curry (‘Bazley’),​[114]​ in the Supreme Court of Canada.  That case saw a charitable organization which ran residential care facilities for emotionally troubled children held vicariously liable for the sexual abuse of a child by a childcare worker employed in the facility. It was held that courts should ‘openly confront the question of whether liability should lie against the employer, rather than obscuring the decision beneath semantic discussions of ‘scope of employment’ and ‘modes of conduct.’’​[115]​ The court held that public policy requires a ‘strong connection between what the employer was asking the employee to do … and the wrongful act.  This means that ‘the employer significantly increased the risk of the harm by putting the employee in his or her position and requiring him to perform the assigned tasks,’​[116]​ so as to justify the imposition of liability.   However, there still remained a need to identify the wrong as being ‘closely and materially related to a risk introduced or enhanced by the employer’s enterprise, otherwise it would serve no deterrent purpose and would simply render the employer an insurer.’​[117]​ 
McLachlin J set out a range of general factors relevant to determining the sufficiency of this connection.​[118]​ Her Honour also considered particular factors relevant to determining whether an employer had introduced or significantly exacerbated the specific risk of child sexual abuse.  These included; whether an employee is permitted or required to be alone with a child for extended periods of time; supervising activities such as bathing or toileting or permitting physical contact with intimate body zones; putting the employee in a position of intimacy with and power over the child (which may enhance the risk of the employee feeling that he or she is able to take advantage of the child and the child submitting without effective complaint); and encouraging the employee to stand in a position of respect and encouraging the child to emulate or obey.  
The court contrasted this degree of connection with something merely ‘incidental’ such as simply providing the opportunity in terms of time or place, which would be insufficient to justify vicarious liability.  For example, an act of abuse by a gardener or cleaner in a school, not charged with responsibilities for the care or welfare of the child, would not give rise to vicarious liability. These principles in relation to vicarious liability have been approved by Canadian courts in numerous cases subsequently.​[119]​  
Three years later, the English House of Lords overruled earlier authority of the Court of Appeal​[120]​ in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd to hold that an institution might be held vicariously liable for child sexual abuse of a child in a boarding hosue by a warden.  The reasons of the court differed.  Lord Steyn​[121]​  posed a test of enquiring whether there was a close connection between the abuse and the employment.​[122]​ However the means for determining the closeness of the connection were not clear.  The Supreme Court in the United Kingdom has clarified the test in the context of institutional child sexual abuse.  In Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare (‘Catholic Child Welfare’).​[123]​ Lord Phillips concluded that vicarious liability is imposed where the defendant has used the abuser to further its own interests and put the abuser in a position which has ‘created or significantly enhanced the risk that the victim or victims would suffer the relevant abuse.’​[124]​  In Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc​[125]​ the Supreme Court approved Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd and Catholic Child Welfare and held that, ‘[t]he cases in which the necessary connection has been found … are cases in which the employee used or misused the position entrusted to him in a way which injured the third party.’​[126]​
These developments in vicarious liability in Canada and the United Kingdom have been approved and applied by the by the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong in The Min An Insurance Co (HK) Ltd v The Ritz-Carlton Ltd​[127]​ and by the Court of Appeal in Singapore in  Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacitif Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd.​[128]​   
As a result of these developments, Australian vicarious liability law is narrower than the law in these other common law jurisdictions.​[129]​
(2)	 The Non-Delegable Duty of Care 
A non-delegable duty is a personal duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken​[130]​ that cannot be avoided by delegating a function integral to that positive duty​[131]​ to independent contractors.  Any negligence on the part of an independent contractor in fulfilling such a duty will be sheeted home to the principal.​[132]​ Recognised categories have been said to involve ‘a person being so placed in relation to another as ‘to assume a particular responsibility for [that other person’s] safety’ because of the latter’s ‘special dependence or vulnerability,’​[133]​  such as the duty that a hospital owes to its patients,​[134]​ the duty owed by school authorities to students​[135]​ and the duty owed by employers to their employees in respect of workplace safety.​[136]​  
It is strongly arguable that institutions undertaking the care and supervision of a child would be similarly found to owe a non-delegable duty of care to children in a manner comparable to the duty recognised in schools. If an independent contractor was found to be negligent in failing to prevent child sexual abuse, an institution may be liable under the non-delegable duty for that negligence.  However, can an institution be rendered directly liable under a non-delegable duty for the intentional tort of assault rather than negligence? 
	In New South Wales v Lepore,​[137]​ the majority rejected this argument.​[138]​  Under Australian law, the scope of the non-delegable duty of care is limited to negligence and negligence has not been held to extend to criminal intentional wrongdoing.  The duty of care in negligence is concerned with circumstances where the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty to take reasonable care and breaches that duty through unintentional conduct which was nevertheless inconsistent with what a reasonable person would do in response to a foreseeable risk, which thereby causes harm.  Although there is academic debate about circumstances in which negligence can extent to intentional wrongdoing, child sexual abuse amounts to criminal intentional wrongdoing and it was held that this is beyond the scope of the non-delegable duty.  In Lepore,  Gleeson CJ (with whom Callinan J agreed​[139]​) observed that:
Intentional wrongdoing, especially intentional criminality, introduces a factor of legal relevance beyond a mere failure to take care.  Homicide, rape, and theft are all acts that are inconsistent with care of person or property, but to characterise them as failure to take care, for the purposes of assigning tortious responsibility to a third party, would be to evade an issue. ​[140]​
McHugh J alone, however, held that a non-delegable duty could extend to intentional wrongdoing.​[141]​  On this basis, the teacher’s actions constituted a breach of the employer’s non-delegable duty to take reasonable care for the safety of the plaintiff.​[142]​  In his view, all the pupil had to show is that given the general situation that gave rise to the harm suffered, ‘a reasonable education authority would have protected the pupil from the harm-causing event’.​[143]​  
As a result of Lepore, an institution cannot be rendered liable under a non-delegable duty for intentional torts committed by an employee or independent contractor.  However, an institution could potentially be liable for negligent conduct by an independent contractor where that failure to exercise reasonable care results in the sexual abuse of a child by another. 
(3)	  The Liability of Institutions in the Tort of Negligence
An institution might be sued directly in the tort of negligence on the basis that it owed, and breached, a duty of care to children in its care. The elements of the cause of action in negligence that would have to be established by a plaintiff in respect of institutional child abuse are:
1.	That the institution owed a duty of care to the plaintiff child who was reasonably foreseeable as a member of a class of persons who might suffer damage if the institution failed to take reasonable care and having regard to the salient features of the case.
2.	That the institution breached its duty of care by failing to act reasonably to avoid a foreseeable risk of injury to the child by sexual abuse by persons associated with the Institution. 
3.	That the breach of the duty by the institution caused reasonably foreseeable damage to the child.​[144]​
Because of the historical nature of so many claims of child sexual abuse and the evidentiary burden resting on plaintiffs, there may be considerable difficulty in establishing the elements of the cause of action in negligence.
The Duty of Care
There are institutions, such as schools, which fall into well-established categories of duty of care: so that it is beyond doubt that a duty of care is owed to children in their care.​[145]​ In other instances outside the established duty categories however, the plaintiff has to prove that a duty of care existed having regard to established tort law principles.​[146]​ 
The imposition of a duty of care at common law depends on reasonable foreseeability by the defendant that harm of the same general kind (as happened) might come to a person or class of persons of whom the plaintiff is one, if the defendant fails to take care.​[147]​ In addition, the plaintiff must establish that there exist some salient features of the case which would mitigate in favour of imposition of a duty of care.​[148]​ The factors of vulnerability of the plaintiff and control by the defendant together with the level of the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s situation have been identified as significant features indicating a duty of care.​[149]​ In an institutional child sexual abuse case the extreme vulnerability of the child is obvious, as is the level of control exercised by most institutional defendants and their knowledge of the child’s situation. In a case concerning a different type of defendant the factors of knowledge and control by the defendant may not be so evident, especially where the defendant is a non-residential public authority or perhaps a state welfare organisation.​[150]​ The special considerations applying to the duty of care of public authorities are discussed below.
The Royal Commission has pointed out​[151]​ that outside the school-pupil and agency-ward contexts, there is uncertainty as to which situations will give rise to a duty of care. The Royal Commission makes the observation that there is apparently no instance in Australia where a religious organisation that is not a school has been held to owe a duty of care to a sexually abused child.​[152]​   Though, in both Salvation Army v Rundle​[153]​ and SDW v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints​[154]​ the courts held that such a duty of care was arguable when considering extensions of limitation periods.
At the duty of care enquiry the plaintiff must establish that the Institution could have reasonably foreseen, at the time of the abuse, that its failure to take reasonable care was not unlikely to result in a consequence of the same general character​[155]​ as a child in its care being sexually abused.  This test has been described as an ‘unde​manding’ test.​[156]​ Yet for survivors of historical child sexual abuse who seek to make institutions directly liable for want of care, it may be difficult to establish on the balance of probabilities that at a time many years past, sexual abuse of a child in care and resulting psychiatric damage were reasonably foreseeable. There is considerable evidence now about historical levels of paedophilia and the incidence of child sexual abuse in religious institutions in particular, as well as recent past knowledge within those institutions about the problem.​[157]​  In cases of long past abuse, however, it may be difficult to provide evidence that the institution should have known at the time about the risk of abuse. 
Breach of the Duty of Care
The next hurdle for the plaintiff in a negligence claim against an institution is proof of negligence: a breach of the duty of care. The success of the claim will depend on establishing a sufficient degree of actual or imputed knowledge of the institution about the level of risk of sexual abuse of children in its care at the time of the abuse together with an unreasonable failure to take precaution to avoid that risk.​[158]​ At common law a risk is reasonably foreseeable if it is “not far-fetched or fanciful.”​[159]​ In most Australian jurisdictions following tort law reforms in 2002/3, the plaintiff will have to prove that the risk of injury by sexual abuse was not only reasonably foreseeable but also that it was a ‘not insignificant’​[160]​ risk. How rigorously the courts will interpret the ‘not-insignificant’ requirement is somewhat uncertain.  In NSW it has been held that whilst the ‘not-insignificant’ test is more demanding than the ‘not far-fetched or fanciful’ test for reasonable foreseeability, it is not extended   ‘by very much.’​[161]​  A plaintiff will be confronted by similar difficulties in proving reasonable foreseeability at this stage as was the case at the duty of care enquiry, though here the requirement is stricter given that there is the added statutory requirement that the risk be ‘not insignificant.’ 
Under civil liability legislation in most Australian jurisdictions, the matters relevant to the determination of negligence are prescribed,​[162]​ though they echo the common law ‘Shirt’ calculus of negligence which requires the court to consider the magnitude of the risk and the degree of the probability of its occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action as well as any other conflicting responsibilities which the defendant may have.​[163]​  Provided that reasonable foreseeability of the relevant level of risk of abuse can be attributed to an institutional defendant then a survivor of abuse would have some prospect of establishing that the failure of the institution to take any precaution at all against abuse (as seems to have been the case in very many instances) or worse, to have ignored credible reports of abuse​[164]​ would amount to negligent failure to discharge its duty of care.  
On the breach of duty of care issue there is the question of what precautions a reasonable institution having the care of children might have taken to ameliorate or remove the risk of sexual abuse of children within its sphere of responsibility.  The plaintiff must establish that there was a reasonably practicable means available to the defendant to avoid the risk at the time of the abuse.​[165]​ 
In A, DC v Prince Alfred College Inc.,​[166]​ the majority held that the plaintiff who was sexually abused as a 12 year old by a school boarding master in 1963 failed to establish breach of the duty of care by the school. The South Australian Full Court held there was no evidence that even if enquiries had been made about the suitability of the abusive teacher prior to his employment, his previous indecency conviction would have come to light and further that there was no evidence of a practice amongst schools to conduct such investigations in 1963.​[167]​ It was also held that it was not practicable to have constant supervision of a boarding master and once the abuse was discovered,​[168]​ the school’s failure to provide psychiatric care to the plaintiff was not negligent because of the limited knowledge in 1963 about the effects of child sexual abuse.​[169]​ Given that the abuse in this case happened more than 50 years ago, it must be appreciated that the conduct of the school was being judged against the standards applicable then. 
As an indication of the standards applicable today, the Victorian Family and Community Development Committee considered in its Betrayal of Trust Report, that there are some important focus areas where prevention of criminal child abuse in organisations might be addressed.​[170]​ The report points to three core elements: effective selection of suitable personnel, including paid and voluntary ministers of religion and contractors; managing situational and environmental risks to reduce the opportunity for abuse; and creating child-safe organisational cultures. Failures of institutions to adopt these types of preventative measures would arguably amount to negligent failure to discharge their duty of care, though in cases of long past abuse, the prevailing standards at the relevant time were lower.
Once a plaintiff has established a breach of the duty of care, it is necessary to establish the causal link between the abuse and any resulting physical and or psychiatric injury.​[171]​ This would entail adducing detailed medical evidence concerning the plaintiff’s physical and psychiatric history and the aetiology of his or her medical conditions.
Very few negligence cases in respect of child sexual abuse against institutions have gone to trial on the substantive issues.​[172]​ No doubt this is because the practical effectiveness of the tort of negligence in providing a remedy against an institution for historical abuse depends on the length of time since the abuse, available evidence as to institutional knowledge (actual or imputed) and what was considered reasonable practice for the protection of children at the time. These difficulties are the result of the specific circumstances of individual historical cases rather than any systemic failure of the substantive law of negligence. 
Plaintiffs’ prospects of just compensation by institutional defendants would be much improved if the law of vicarious liability was reformed, so that plaintiffs would be relying on evidence of an abuser’s deliberate tortious conduct to establish strict liability of the institution rather than on evidence of institutional failure to take reasonable care to avoid abuse.
Civil Liability Legislation in Australian Jurisdictions and Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Cases
All Australian States and Territories reformed some aspects of the common law of negligence in 2002/3 following the Ipp Report of the Review of Negligence,​[173]​ though the reforms were not uniform.​[174]​  Accordingly some aspects of survivors' claims against institutions responsible for child sexual abuse may be subject to different legal rules and damages may be assessed differently, depending on the jurisdiction. Australian law has developed settled rules to identify the choice of law to be applied in tortious claims, which will generally be the law of the place where the tort was committed.​[175]​ Given that the problem of institutional child sexual abuse is a national one, differential treatment of survivors’ claims depending on where their abuse took place is most undesirable and could be avoided by reform of state and territory civil liability legislation so that it would not apply to institutional child sexual abuse cases. All cases would then be subject to the same national common law. 
In general, the civil liability legislation in Australian jurisdictions does not apply to intentional acts that are sexual assault, though in some jurisdictions that is not the case.​[176]​The NSW legislation does not apply to claims for trespass to person in respect of deliberate harm or sexual assault. Nor does it apply where an institution is sued on the basis of its vicarious liability for deliberate harm by another person.​[177]​ But where an institution is sued in negligence for a failure to discharge its duty to protect children in its care, then civil liability legislation will apply to the claim. This is the case in most states and territories. 
	The aspects of civil liability legislation in Australian states and territories which would differentially affect claims by survivors are the provisions concerning the duty of care of public authorities, psychiatric injury claims and restrictions on assessment of damages. 
Public Authority Defendants 
Civil liability legislation in all Australian jurisdictions, excepting South Australia and the Northern Territory, makes special provision concerning the liability in negligence of statutory or public authorities, ​[178]​ though there are jurisdictional differences. Some institutional defendants in negligence claims concerning child sexual abuse may well be public authorities within the definitions in the various civil liability statutes.
 A public authority is defined in NSW as including a government department, or a public health organisation or any public or local authority constituted by or under an Act.​[179]​ This definition would include NSW government schools and by virtue of Civil Liability Regulation 2014 (NSW) non-government schools are prescribed as authorities to which the NSW act applies. The definition would include all government departments, health authorities, local councils and any bodies that are created and empowered by a NSW statute. The definitions in other Australian jurisdictions are similar though some are narrower.​[180]​ 
If a survivor of institutional child sexual abuse claims in negligence against an institution that is within the definition of a public authority, then the civil liability legislation will need to be considered. It sets out specific principles that apply on the issues of whether a public authority owes a duty of care or has breached a duty of care in negligence. These principles include that an authority’s functions are limited by its financial and other resources; that the general allocation of resources is not open to question; that the functions required of an authority are to be determined by reference to its broad range of activities; and that authorities may rely on compliance with general procedures as evidence of proper exercise of functions.​[181]​ 
Psychiatric Injury
In most cases of child sexual abuse the adult plaintiff’s damage consists of psychiatric harm. In all Australian jurisdictions except Queensland and the Northern Territory, civil liability legislation governs claims in respect of negligently inflicted psychiatric injury.​[182]​ The provisions apply to all negligence claims for psychiatric harm whether the plaintiff is claiming for pure mental harm or mental harm that is consequential on a physical injury. Whilst the legislation is not identical across jurisdictions, generally its effect is to limit recovery for pure mental harm to recognised psychiatric illness​[183]​ and to confine the duty of care not to cause mental harm to cases where it was foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude might suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken.​[184]​
Civil Liability Legislation Restrictions on Damages 
Civil liability legislation across Australian jurisdictions imposes severe limitations on personal injury damages recoverable. Because of the specific exclusion of some causes of action, the restrictions on damages do not apply to claims for deliberate harm or sexual assault in some jurisdictions. In NSW for example, a plaintiff’s claim in respect of a sexual battery against a perpetrator will not be subject to the very significant restrictions on personal injury compensatory damages imposed by Part 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) or the prohibition on the award of exemplary and aggravated damages in s 21 which applies in respect of negligent conduct alone. In Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia the position is similar to that in NSW.​[185]​ 
There was formerly some doubt about whether the damages restrictions imposed by the legislation would apply in a case where a defendant is sued on the basis that it is vicariously liable for a deliberate battery committed by another person.  A claim against the perpetrator is clearly excluded from the operation of the legislation in NSW by s 3B(1)(a). The wording of the section might be read as excluding only the liability of the perpetrator because the section refers to ‘an intentional act that is done by the person… that is sexual assault committed by the person’ (emphasis added). But, in Zorom Enterprises Pty Ltd V Zabow & Ors​[186]​ the NSW Court of Appeal interpreted the section as excluding the operation of the act in cases where a defendant is vicariously liable for the deliberate act of an employee. The position in other Australian jurisdictions may remain somewhat uncertain.
In the case of a survivor’s claim in negligence against an institutional defendant, the substantial restrictions on personal injury damages imposed by civil liability legislation would apply. Several Australian jurisdictions restrict compensatory damages by imposing caps on damages for economic and non-economic loss, gratuitous services, and interest as well as thresholds for general damages.​[187]​ These would produce variations and disparity resulting in under–compensation of survivors in many cases and differential compensation amongst survivors of institutional abuse across Australia. ​[188]​
Aggravated and Exemplary Damages 
Aggravated damages are a type of compensatory damages awarded where a plaintiff has been subjected to ‘high handed, malicious, insulting or oppressive’​[189]​ conduct or has been humiliated​[190]​ and emotionally distressed.​[191]​ Aggravated damages compensate for intangible as well as actual injury caused by the manner of the defendant’s wrongdoing.​[192]​ Exemplary damages are punitive in nature. Whilst aggravated damages depend on factors such as humiliation, embarrassment, shame, and emotional distress of the plaintiff, exemplary damages address the blameworthy behaviour of the defendant and are awarded as punishment, retribution and deterrence.​[193]​ 
The leading High Court authority on exemplary damages is Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Limited​[194]​ and Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren​[195]​  where the court held that exemplary damages may be awarded where a defendant's conduct is ‘high handed, insolent, vindictive or malicious’ or where the defendant has displayed a ‘contumelious disregard of the plaintiff's rights’.​[196]​ The sexual abuse of a child is such a grave human rights abuse that common law principles might very often indicate the imposition of punitive damages. Exemplary damages have been awarded in many kinds of tortious causes of action in Australia including in cases of battery​[197]​ and false imprisonment.​[198]​ The High Court has held that an award of both aggravated and exemplary damages is permissible and does not amount to a 'double punishment' where the quantum of each is not excessive, because the two are not the same.​[199]​  
In most states aggravated and exemplary damages awards are available in claims for sexual battery and other intentional torts against perpetrators, and the same ought to be available in relation to claims for compensation arising from child sexual abuse.​[200]​ But in the majority of cases there will be little point in the survivor suing the perpetrator alone, because of the improbability of a judgment being paid.  Where an institutional defendant is vicariously liable for the deliberate tort of the perpetrator, exemplary and aggravated damages should also be available, on current authority, against the institution in most states.​[201]​ In Erlich v Liefer​[202]​ exemplary damages were awarded against both the abuser and the school (which was vicariously liable for the abuse) in circumstances where once the abuse was reported, the school facilitated the perpetrator’s very speedy departure overseas. Rush J held that the conduct of the school Board was ‘disgraceful and contumelious’ and demonstrated a ‘complete disregard’ for the victims of the abuse as well as ‘disdain for due process of criminal investigation.’​[203]​
	Because of the provisions of civil liability legislation in some Australian jurisdictions,​[204]​ without statutory reform, aggravated and/or exemplary damages will not be available in claims against institutional defendants where the cause of action is in the tort of negligence. Though there is no such prohibition with regard to claims for deliberate harm,​[205]​ except in the Northern Territory where no exemplary or aggravated damages may be awarded for personal injury.​[206]​ The differing legislative provisions across Australian jurisdictions concerning the availability of aggravated and exemplary damages against negligent institutions would result in differential entitlement for survivors of institutional child abuse depending on the state or territory in which their abuse occurred. Given that the problem of institutional child sexual abuse is a national one, this is an undesirable outcome that can be avoided by legislative reform.

5.  AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPMENTS
A.     The Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Abuse
On 14 September 2015, the Royal Commission published its final​[207]​ Redress and Civil Litigation Report containing recommendations in relation to the provision of effective redress for survivors through the establishment of a national redress scheme, and recommendations for reforms to civil litigation systems ‘to make civil litigation a more effective means of providing justice to survivors.’  This section provides a brief overview of the recommendations of the Commission.
a.	A Short Summary of the Proposed Redress Scheme 
The Royal Commission has recommended the establishment of a national redress scheme to compensate survivors of institutional child sexual abuse with a monetary payment and to provide access to counselling and psychological care.​[208]​   The recommended scheme is extremely complex and it is estimated by the consultants engaged by the Royal Commission that there will be some 60,000 eligible claimants.​[209]​ 
	The Royal Commission called for the scheme to be established by 1 July 2017.​[210]​ The Turnbull government has announced that it will ‘lead the development of a national approach to redress’ and that it will ‘soon’ commence discussions with the states and territories.​[211]​  the NSW and Victorian attorneys-general have expressed their support for the proposal.​[212]​ The establishment of a national scheme will require extraordinary cooperation amongst the commonwealth and all state and territory governments as well as the institutions in which abuse has taken place over the years. 
	Based on an average payment of $65,000 per claimant and including costs for counselling services and administration, the total estimated redress budget is $4.01 billion over a 10 year period.  The Royal Commission recommended the Scheme have no fixed closing date​[213]​ and be primarily funded by the institutions in which abuse occurred:​[214]​ schools, churches, government and non-government institutions. In the case of institutions that no longer exist but that were part of a larger group or have a successor, the group or successor institution should fund redress.​[215]​  State and Federal governments would be ‘funders of last resort’​[216]​ in cases where no redress would be otherwise available on the basis that historical abuse is a societal responsibility and government has broad responsibilities beyond government-run institutions, including responsibilities that arise from their regulatory and guardianship of children roles.​[217]​
	The Royal Commission’s recommendation is that the application process should be as simple as possible requiring a written application form​[218]​ which provides sufficient information to enable a determination of eligibility and the assessment of a monetary payment. The proposed decision making process would be transparent and administrative in nature with decisions based on detailed assessment procedures and guidelines.​[219]​ There would be an internal review process with a complaints mechanism to existing ombudsmen.​[220]​ The Royal Commission recommends that the standard of proof for the redress scheme should be ‘reasonable likelihood’ which is lower than the common law standard of ‘on the balance of probabilities.’ ​[221]​
	The Royal Commission recommends a maximum (and untaxed) payment of $200,000 (for the most severe cases) with an average payment of $65,000 and a minimum payment of $10,000 (with an adjustment being made for any compensation already received). Payments would be assessed by reference to a detailed matrix that would allow assessment of the severity of abuse and its impact.​[222]​  
The proposed criteria for eligibility for redress are quite broad so that living​[223]​ survivors are eligible if they were sexually abused as children in an institutional context.  An institution is defined​[224]​ as ‘any public or private body, agency, association, club, institution, organisation or other entity or group of entities of any kind (whether incorporated or unincorporated).’​[225]​  Abuse would be taken to have occurred in an institutional context where it happened on the premises of an institution or in a place where institutional activities took place or in connection with the activities of an institution in circumstances where the institution should have been responsible for the contact between the abuser and the applicant.​[226]​  Further, an institution will be responsible where the abuse was by an official of an institution and where the institution had created, facilitated, increased, or in any way contributed to the risk of abuse or where abuse was committed by an adult abuser where the institution should be treated as being responsible for the abuser having contact with the child.
	The Royal Commission has recommended that if an applicant accepts a monetary payment under the redress scheme they will be required to release the scheme (including the contributing government or governments) and the institution from any further liability for institutional child sexual abuse.​[227]​ The scheme would fund legal advice to applicants prior to acceptance of a redress offer and signing a deed of release.​[228]​ Such a requirement means that an applicant would have to forego any right to a tortious remedy in damages as a condition of the payment under the redress scheme.
b.	Proposed Reforms in Relation to Limitation Periods
The Royal Commission has recommended that state and territory governments should retrospectively remove limitation periods in respect of all claims for personal injury resulting from childhood sexual abuse in an institutional context.​[229]​ As discussed above NSW and Victoria have already taken this step. It is a simple and effective way of allowing plaintiffs to pursue a tortious remedy in respect of childhood sexual abuse and would avoid costly and uncertain preliminary proceedings where defendants plead the limitation defence in order to have claims struck out. Judicial powers to order a stay, or to strike out or dismiss unmeritorious claims, provide protection to defendants against very prejudicial proceedings in respect of long past events.
c.	Proposals for Identification of ‘Proper Defendants’ with Assets Where Unincorporated Associations are Responsible for Abuse 
The Royal Commission has recommended legislation to require some institutions to nominate proper defendants to enable survivors to claim where there is no entity to sue. However, this reform would only be of benefit to future victims of institutional child sexual abuse as it is not proposed that it be retrospective.​[230]​ Where an institution fails to nominate a proper defendant with adequate assets, but is associated with a property trust, then that trust would be the proper defendant thus making its assets available to meet the institution’s liability.​[231]​ Unfortunately the Royal Commission did not persist with its earlier suggestion that would have allowed the plaintiff to access such trusts directly, without having to wait for the defendant to fail to nominate a proper defendant.​[232]​  
	There are many unincorporated associations, from junior sporting clubs to community child minding groups, which are responsible for the well-being of children in their care.  Unlike church organisations, many secular institutions would probably not be associated with any property trusts and the Royal Commission has made no recommendations at all concerning these. Survivors of childhood sexual abuse in this type of association would have no opportunity to sue the institution or association in tort because of the lack of a corporate defendant. Further in the case of many associations (particularly small groups, sporting or other clubs) there may be no assets which would be available to meet a judgment, even if there were an entity to be sued.
A statutory requirement for incorporation and compulsory insurance (against civil liability for child abuse) of non-government organisations that undertake responsibility for the physical welfare or spiritual, psychological or emotional guidance of children would ensure that survivors of abuse have a corporate entity to sue.   The Commission considered this type of statutory requirement​[233]​ but recognised that compulsory incorporation and insurance might deter people from being part of small informal associations ‘potentially losing the various sporting, cultural and other activities they provide in the community.’​[234]​ There would be scope to exempt small organisations of particular types (sporting and other clubs with small memberships, for example) from incorporation or to limit the insurance requirement.​[235]​ Yet, ultimately the Royal Commission decided against any recommendation for compulsory incorporation or insurance of any kind of organisation. 
The Commission did however suggest that where unincorporated bodies receive direct or indirect government funding to provide children’s services, they might be required at least to insure.​[236]​ The Commission also accepted that there may be ‘some merit’ in the Victorian Parliament Family and Community Development Committee’s recommendation that, where the Victorian Government funds non-government organisations or provides them with tax exemptions and/or other entitlements, the government consider requiring them to be incorporated and adequately insured.​[237]​ I 
d.	Proposals for reform to create statutory causes of action to render institutions liable for child sexual abuse
The Royal Commission recommended the introduction of two new statutory liabilities, both of which would have prospective operation only.​[238]​   
(i) The Royal Commission’s recommendation for a non-delegable duty of care.
In its Report, the Commission recommended that:
 [S]tate and territory governments should introduce legislation to impose a non-delegable duty on certain institutions for institutional child sexual abuse despite it being the deliberate criminal act of a person associated with the institution’.​[239]​ 
The Commission has proposed that this statutory duty should apply only to specified institutions​[240]​ including residential facilities for children, any school or day care facility, disability or health services or any religious organisation or other facility operated for profit that provides services that involve the facility having the care, supervision or control of children for a period of time.​[241]​  The Commission proposes that institutions to whom the statutory duty applies may be liable for the acts of ‘members or employees’ which are defined broadly to cover almost any working relationship, including independent contractors.​[242]​  
It is noteworthy that the proposed duty appears to be potentially broader in scope than the law of vicarious liability which applies in other common law jurisdictions, in two respects.  First, it is not limited by the requirement for an employment relationship So it would extend to wrongdoing by independent contractors and volunteers. Second, it does not appear to be limited by any additional requirement for a ‘significant connection’ between the sexual abuse and the creation of the risk of that abuse by the institution in the manner required under English and Canadian law under vicarious liability (discussed above).  This expands its scope significantly compared to other common law jurisdictions.      
(ii) Non-Strict Vicarious Liability and a Reverse Onus of Proof
The Royal Commission has also recommended that, irrespective of whether a non-delegable duty of care is imposed on certain types of institution by statute, legislation should be introduced to make all institutions liable for child sexual abuse by a broad range of persons associated with the institution unless the institution proves it took reasonable steps to prevent the abuse.​[243]​  The Royal Commission’s Report describes this liability as  ‘reversing the onus of proof.’​[244]​ The Royal Commission has said:
 … institutions should be liable for child sexual abuse by their members or employees unless the institution proves it took reasonable steps to prevent abuse.  We are satisfied that the reverse onus of proof should apply prospectively only and not retrospectively. ​[245]​
This liability would apply to all institutions as defined in the Terms of Reference, including institutions to which the non-delegable duty of care would not apply.  This means it would apply to almost all groups and entities, public or private (other than families), which bring adults into contact with children.​[246]​  Accordingly, the reach of this provision is extremely broad.  
Unlike common law vicarious liability, this proposed liability would not be strict because it may be avoided upon proof by the institution that it took reasonable care to prevent abuse. In essence, it creates a defence to vicarious liability that is unknown to the common law. This aspect of the proposal therefore represents a significant advantage for institutions. If an institution took reasonable steps (whatever they might be) to prevent abuse, it would apparently escape liability, even if the circumstances would otherwise warrant the imposition of vicarious liability in other common law jurisdictions.
However, the Commission has not provided any detail as to what might constitute ‘reasonable steps to prevent abuse’, recognising that what are reasonable steps for an institution to take to avoid child sexual abuse will vary depending upon the type of institution and the position and responsibility of the abuser within the institution.​[247]​ More active steps toward precaution might be expected of a for-profit institution than a community-volunteer institution, and more may be required in relation to employees than independent contractors. These questions will depend on many individual circumstances but will no doubt involve complex factual issues such as reasonable foreseeability of risk, and the kinds of matters typically relevant to a finding of negligence.​[248]​ The Royal Commission noted that institutions should be in a good position to prove the steps that they did take, having better access to records and witnesses than a plaintiff is likely to have.  
As with the proposed non-delegable duty, there is apparently no requirement for any connection between the abuse and the work of the associate for the benefit of the institution, or any enhancement of the risk of sexual abuse by the institution in assigning tasks to the associate.​[249]​ For example, assume that a cleaner at a sporting club abused a child attending soccer training.  Under the Canadian and English expanded vicarious liability principles at common law, the claim would most likely fail as there is nothing inherent in the tasks of cleaning premises which materially increases the risk of child sexual abuse.  However, this scenario would appear to be caught by the Commission’s recommended liability if the club fails to establish that it took reasonable steps to prevent the abuse.  In this way, the proposed liability upon all institutions is broader than vicarious liability at common, although there is a defence not available at common law.
B.      Victorian Government’s ‘Betrayal of Trust’ Report – Recommendations and Implementation
In April 2012, , the Victorian Government’sFamily and Community Development Committee (‘the Committee’) established an inquiry to investigate the handling of child abuse by religious and other non-government organisations.  The Committee conducted a broad ranging inquiry and tabled its Report, ‘Betrayal of Trust’ in Parliament on 15 November 2013.​[250]​  The Report contained 15 recommendations across five broad themes of reforming the criminal law, improving access to civil avenues of justice, creating an alternate avenue for justice to the courts, improving organisation responses to allegations of criminal child abuse and improving the prevention of criminal child abuse. The Victorian Government tabled its response to the ‘Betrayal of Trust’ Report on 8 May 2014 giving support, or in-principle support, to all of the recommendations. 
The Report contained five particular recommendations relevant to the issues covered in this chapter in relation to access to compensation through civil litigation.  In particular it recommended that the Victorian Government consider requiring non-government organisations to be incorporated and adequately insured where it funds them or provides them with tax exemptions and/or other entitlements.​[251]​   Secondly, it recommended that the Victorian Government work with the Australian Government to require religious and other non-government organisations that engage with children to adopt incorporated legal structures.​[252]​  Third, it recommended that the Victorian Government consider amending the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) to exclude criminal child abuse from the operation of the limitations period under that Act.​[253]​ 
In relation to the liability of institutions for child sexual abuse by perpetrators working for the institution, the Committee concluded that, ‘[i]t should be recognised that non-government organisations are directly liable for harm suffered by children in their care given that the perpetrator has relied on the reputation and community’s trust in the organisation to offend against the child.’​[254]​  The Committee was of the view that, ‘an organisation should be held vicariously liable (on the basis of the existence of a deemed employment relationship with its agents, representatives or volunteers who it has permitted to act on its behalf) for acts committed in the course of that relationship.’​[255]​ The Committee therefore recommended that the Victorian Government undertake a review of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) and identify whether legislative amendment could be made to ensure organisations are held accountable and have a legal duty to take reasonable care to prevent criminal child abuse.​[256]​  
To date the Victorian Government has implemented legislation giving effect to the Committee’s recommendations with respect to amending the criminal law,​[257]​ but has not yet implemented legislative change with respect to the recommendations relating to vicarious liability or other reforms to improve access to civil litigation.  

CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights​[258]​ and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights​[259]​, Australia has an international legal obligation to ensure effective remedies for survivors of human rights abuses. The deliberate physical and sexual abuse of children by those who should care for them is a most egregious form of human rights abuse and proper and adequate compensation for survivors is both a moral and a legal imperative. 
Survivors of institutional child sexual abuse in Australia do not have the same established legal basis to claim that an institution ought to be found vicariously liable for child sexual abuse that occurred in the care of the institution that is available to survivors in other common law jurisdictions such as Canada and England.  This disparity arises from key developments to the law of vicarious liability in those jurisdictions facilitating such claims in certain circumstances that have not occurred to date in Australia.  This limits the avenues for civil compensation for Australian survivors of institutional child sexual abuse.
Significant law reform proposals have been made to address this and some of the other practical and legal difficulties discussed in this chapter by both the Royal Commission and the Family and Community Development Committee of the Victorian Parliament.  It remains to be seen whether governments will adopt any or all of these recommendations, or what form any legislative response might take.  There is of course also scope for  institutional vicarious liability to be clarified through tort law development by the courts if legislative reform is not passed.  If the issues were to come before the Australian High Court again, one question might be whether the court would take the opportunity to develop the law of vicarious liability in a manner consistent with, or with comparable effect to, these developments other common law jurisdictions, having not taken that step in New South Wales v Lepore.   
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